The United States Position on Revising the Paris Convention: Quid Pro Quo or Denunciation by Loughran, Regina A.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 5, Issue 2 1981 Article 7
The United States Position on Revising the
Paris Convention: Quid Pro Quo or
Denunciation
Regina A. Loughran∗
∗
Copyright c©1981 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The United States Position on Revising the
Paris Convention: Quid Pro Quo or
Denunciation
Regina A. Loughran
Abstract
This Comment will begin by examining the history and purposes of the Paris Convention and
its revisions; second, it will examine the conflict between the developed and developing nations
regarding the Convention revision; and third, it will examine the legal validity of denouncing the
Convention and establishing a new multilateral treaty. Finally, this Comment will suggest the
approach the United States should adopt to advance its position regarding the Paris Convention
revision.
THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON REVISING THE PARIS
CONVENTION: QUID PRO QUO OR DENUNCIATION
INTRODUCTION
Developed nations, especially the United States, insist that any
proposed substantive revision of the Paris Convention for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property' (Paris Convention or Convention)
continue the system of reciprocity and equality among member
states. 2  Lesser developed countries (LDCs),3 on the other hand,
suggest that a program of preferential treatment 4 for developing
countries be included in the substantive revision of the Conven-
1. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, 25 Stat. 1372,
T.S. No. 379, 10 Martens Nouveau Recueil 2d 133, revised Dec. 14, 1900, 32 Stat. 1936, T.S.
No. 411, 30 Martens Nouveau Recueil 2d 465, revised June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, T.S. No.
579, 8 Martens Nouveau Recueil 3d 760, revised Nov. 6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1789, T.S. No. 834, 74
L.N.T.S. 289, revised June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748, T.S. No. 941, 192 L.N.T.S. 17, revised
Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, revised July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].
All citations to the Paris Convention within this Comment refer to the 1967 Stockholm text.
The Convention consists of 30 articles, of which the first 12 deal with questions of
patents and other forms of industrial property, and the remainder with procedural
and administrative matters, including the amendment of the Convention. There is
no preamble and no general statement of the objectives of the Convention. Article
(1), however, makes clear that the Convention is intended for the "protection of
industrial property." It is in fact a charter of rights for patent holders, its essential
concern being to determine and safeguard their privileges.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report by the UNCTAD Secretar-
iat, the International Patent System: The Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (Provisional Agenda Item 4) at 4, U.N. Doe. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/2 (1977)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Secretariat].
2. The United States would like the procedural system requiring unanimity in voting
to continue as well. See infra note 18. Under the current system the patentee, that is the
patent holder, is favored over the grantor country. See infra note 52.
3. For purposes of this Comment, the terms lesser developed country, LDC, develop-
ing country and developing nation will be used interchangeably.
4. The developing nations define "preferential treatment" in connection with interna-
tional industrial property as a means to decrease the inequality between the developed and
developing countries, rather than as the promotion of the interests of the developing countries
to the detriment of the developed. U. ANDERFELT, INTERNATIONAL PATENT-LEGISLATION AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 265 (1971). The developed countries, in particular the United States,
however, see the preferential treatment program as just that: a system to decrease protection
of the developed countries for the benefit of the developing countries. The issue is strict and
equal protection of industrial property versus rapid technology transfer to lesser developed
countries.
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tion.5  The developing countries suggest such a program is neces-
sary to establish the "new economic order."" This revision will
decide whether the Convention will maintain the status quo of
patentee protection of international industrial property or adopt a
new system favoring technology transfer.
The World Intellectual Property Organization7 (WIPO) un-
dertook a study of a possible revision of the Paris Convention8 on
behalf of the developing countries.9 Subsequently, the members of
the Paris Convention entrusted WIPO with overseeing the revision
of the Convention. 10 The purposes of the current revision are to
5. Furthermore, the developing countries want a voting system requiring less than
unanimity. Such a system would give these countries which constitute a majority in number
an advantage in pushing through substantive changes. Under the unanimity system, one
country alone can block any amendment. See infra note 18.
6. The "new economic order" is discussed infra note 74. The developing countries
perceive the current system as unjustly favoring the patentee. They advocate a system
favoring the grantor country. See infra note 55.
7. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was established at the Intel-
lectual Property Conference of Stockholm in June-July, 1967. It was organized to coordinate
the administrative activities of the Paris and Berne Conventions and to promote all intellec-
tual property rights protected under these two conventions and various other special agree-
ments. U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 259. See also Braderman, The World Intellectual
Property Organization and the Administrative Reorganization of BIRPI, 12 IDEA 673 (1968)
(a detailed discussion of the organization and workings of WIPO); Goldsmith, WIPO: A
Noble Idea Whose Time Has Come, 12 IDEA 691 (1968) (examination of the pros and cons of
WIPO's establishment). See generally S.P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED
RIGHTS §§ 92-100, at 145-52 (1975); UN, EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS 376-77 (1979).
Originally WIPO was not an agency of the U.N.; however, membership was open to
any Paris or Berne Union member as well as any member of the U.N. or one of its specialized
agencies. The latter was included because if WIPO were to become a U.N. agency in the
future, the provision of accession of any U.N. member would be a prerequisite for agency
recognition. S.P. LADAS, supra, §§ 92-94, at 146-47. WIPO has since become a specialized
U.N. agency. Gansser, Violations of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, 11 INDUS. PnoP. & Copy RIGHT L. REv., No. 1 (1980), reprinted in 63 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 138, 142 (1981). A major concern of WIPO is the transfer of technology. Harris,
Technology Transfer and Industrial Property Protection: Problems Underlying Various Euro-
pean Patent and Other Conventions, 19 IDEA 215, 227 (1977-78).
8. Paris Convention, supra note 1. The history and purposes of the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention or Convention) are discussed infra
notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
9. 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 93 (1981) (editorial). This proposal by developing nations
indicated an affirmance of the recognized legal patent right and an acceptance of it as a
component of the world's industrial property system. Id. The draft text of proposed Article
5A is set out at WIPO: Revision of the Paris Convention, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 564, 575-77
(1979) [hereinafter cited as WIPO Revision]. See also S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 107, at 175
(the roles of WIPO, UNCTAD, and UNIDO in facilitating the transfer of technology to the
developing countries).
10. See Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doe. PR/
DC/2 (Apr. 23, 1979).
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align the Convention to the modern needs of the developing na-
tions;" to aid these countries in developing their own patent sys-
tems;' 2 to further the transfer of technology, particularly to the
developing countries;' 3 and to further cooperation among countries
which have different systems of industrial property protection. 14
The first Diplomatic Conference on Revision 15 was not a success. 16
Attempts to start committee work on substantive issues failed be-
cause the conference was deadlocked in a dispute over voting proce-
dure. 17  The voting rules conflict began in 1979; at Geneva in 1980
11. WIPO Revision, supra note 9, at 564. Developing countries aspire to rapid indus-
trialization as the principal means for improving their standards of living. S.P. LADAS, supra
note 7, § 1031, at 1888.
12. WIPO Revision, supra note 9, at 564-65.
13. Id. at 565.
14. Id. The primary reason for the differences in the systems of various countries is that
each system grew independently without any conscious thought of international effects or
needs. S.P. LADAs, supra note 7, § 174, at 283.
15. The Conference was in session from February 4 to March 4, 1980 in Geneva. See
WIPO, Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention, Geneva, February 4
to March 4, 1980, PR/DC/3 (June 25, 1979) (includes a commentary by the WIPO Director
General).
16. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 470, at A-5 (Mar. 13, 1980). The
United States officials had anticipated that the revision conference would not go smoothly.
See PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (RNA) No. 459, at A-8 (Dec. 17, 1979).
17. Decision, WIPO Doc. PR/DC/20 (Mar. 4, 1980); PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) No. 470, at A-5 (Mar. 13, 1980). The Conference had been looked forward to with
interest, and a planned ceremony to sign the revised text was set for the conclusion of the
meeting. However, no decisions on substantive revisions were reached and, therefore, further
revision sessions became necessary. A preliminary meeting meant to ensure success at the
second revision conference ended in failure. The second Diplomatic Conference on Revision
was held in Nairobi, Kenya from September 28 to October 24, 1981. Id.; PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 503, at A-14 (Nov. 6, 1980); PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
No. 529, at A-15 (May 14, 1981). The U.S. delegation to the Nairobi Conference was headed
by former Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Commissioner William E. Schuyler. His
appointment was recommended by current PTO Commissioner Gerald J. Mossinghoff who
was unable to attend the revision conference as serious U.S. PTO budget and legislation issues
were due to arise during its session. For a list of other United States delegates to the
Conference, see PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) No. 547, at A-11 (Sept. 24, 1981). At
the annual meeting of the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Section of the American
Bar Association, Commissioner Mossinghoff addressed the section stating:
We are heavily involved in preparations for the Second Session of the Diplomatic
Conference for the Revision of the Paris Convention . . . . Given the importance of
those negotiations to continued international protection of intellectual property of
U.S. industry, and because of my personal involvement in the day-to-day operations
of the office, I am strongly supporting the appointment of a special representative
from the private sector to head the U.S. delegation. Prospects for complete agree-
ment upon a revised text of the Paris Convention in Nairobi are not great; it is likely
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a compromise was adopted over the objection of the United
States. 18
At the 1981 annual meeting of the Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law Section of the American Bar Association,19 the
section went on record that it deplored the changes in voting rules
adopted at the 1980 Geneva Conference for the revision of the Paris
that we will be discussing a third session of the Diplomatic Conference with you
next year.
Address by Gerald J. Mossinghoff (August 8, 1981), reprinted in 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF PROC. 85, 88.
18. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 470, at A-5 (Mar. 18, 1980). The
Provisional Steering Committee consisted of 24 nations which drew up rules of procedure for
the conference. WIPO Revision, supra note 9, at 567. Preliminary sessions were held prior to
the first Conference on Revision in Geneva. However, no major controversial issues were
resolved. The developed countries failed to submit written comments despite the opportunity
to do so. Cf. Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. PR/
DC/2 (Apr. 23, 1979) at 5 (rule permitting comment by member nations). For a history of the
preliminary negotiations, see WIPO Revision, supra note 9, at 566-67. The Provisional
Steering Committee was unable to reach an agreement and omitted the crucial voting
requirement paragraph. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 470, at A-5 (Mar. 13,
1980). At the 1980 Geneva Conference, the developed nations took the position that unanim-
ity was required for adoption of any rules of procedure as well as adoption of the final text.
All six prior revisions have been adopted unanimously. The developing nations, supported by
the socialist nations, proposed a two-thirds voting requirement. The delegates adopted a
compromise whereby the final text was to be adopted without objection, but if this goal were
not obtained, a two-thirds majority would be sufficient, provided that no more than twelve
members were to vote against. The United States was the only dissenter to the compromise
arrangement and formally reserved the legal right to challenge any substantive action
adopted by less than unanimity. Id.
At the annual meeting of the ABA/PTC Section it was:
RESOLVED, that the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law reiterates
its opposition to any revision of the Paris Convention for the protection [sic] of
Industrial Property, or the adoption of any voting rule therefore, by less than the
unanimous vote of the member countries of the union present and voting; deplores
the declaration by Ambassador Sene, President of the last held diplomatic confer-
ence (February 4-March 4, 1980), made without taking a vote and over the objec-
tion of the United States, that a voting rule had been adopted permitting adoption
of a revision by two thirds majority provided that no more than 12 countries vote
against the proposal; and urges that the United States persist in efforts to retain the
existing procedure based on unanimous vote.
Resolution 102-1, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF PROC. 29.
At the Nairobi Conference, Ambassador Schuyler, head of the United States delegation,
stated that it remains the United States position that the traditional voting rule of unanimity
could only be changed by unanimous agreement. No unanimous agreement was reached on
the voting rule, therefore, no rules of procedure have been legally adopted by the Conference
so any text adopted over the objection of any member will not be valid and need not be
respected by the Union members. Schuyler, Erosion of the Paris Convention at Nairobi, 1
PTC NEwsLmrE 2 (No. 2) (Winter 1982).
19. The meeting was held in New Orleans from August 7 to August 12, 1981.
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Convention. 20  Furthermore, the section proposes that if the final
text revision is determined to be unfavorable to the United States,
the State Department should denounce the Paris Convention and
establish a new treaty. 2' The section strongly opposes any substan-
tive revision which would allow "special dispensations or privileges
for developing countries" 22 or "impose special burdens on devel-
oped countries." 23
This Comment will begin by examining the history and pur-
poses of the Paris Convention and its revisions; second, it will
examine the conflict between the developed and developing nations
regarding the Convention revision; and third, it will examine the
legal validity of denouncing the Convention and establishing a new
multilateral treaty. Finally, this Comment will suggest the ap-
proach the United States should adopt to advance its position re-
garding the Paris Convention revision.
20. Resolution 102-1, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY
OF PROC. 29.
21. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 543, at A-1 (Aug. 27, 1981). The
ABA/PTC Section has:
RESOLVED, that the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, favoring
in principle strong patent and trademark protection in all countries, and noting the
changes in the Paris Convention proposed for the Nairobi Diplomatic Conference
would seriously weaken such protection, urges the Department of State to initiate
consideration of steps which might be taken, in the event of adoption of such
adverse changes in the Paris Convention, including denouncing that Convention
and forming with other nations a new Treaty based substantially upon the princi-
ples of the present Stockholm text of the Paris Convention.
Resolution 606-A, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF PROC.
34.
The second session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Revision (Nairobi Conference)
was not successful. WIPO Press Release No. 16, Geneva (Oct. 27, 1981). A third session will
be held in Geneva from October 4 to October 30, 1982. WIPO Information Release (Jan. 20,
1982).
22. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 543, at A-1 (Aug. 27, 1981) (para-
phrasing Resolution 102-2, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF
Pnoc. 29).
23. Id. The ABA/PTC Section has:
RESOLVED, that the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law opposes
any revision of the Paris Convention which would impose different, greater or lesser
obligations on, or which would grant different, greater or lesser rights or privileges
to, certain states or groups of states party to the convention, or to nationals thereof,
than on or to other states or groups of states party to the convention or their
nationals.
Resolution 102-2, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF PROC. 29.
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I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF
THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
A. Industrial Property
The exclusive right to enjoyment is the essence of property. 24
Exclusivity is incident to every patent; therefore, patents have the
characteristics of property. 25  Historically, the rationale for issuing
patents has been to encourage public disclosure of new, scientific,
and technical developments.26 In effect, the inventor is given a
monopoly on his invention. 27 The purpose of disclosure is to induce
other inventors into activity which will result in additional techno-
logical advancement. 28
Nations use industrial property rights 29 to turn technology into
economic gain. The owner of the rights, or designated agents, are
able to monopolize the commercial market of this particular tech-
nology. 30  The right results in control of trade for a certain com-
modity and therefore is valuable. 31  The value of the right fosters
incentive to create further protectable technology. 32  The ideal
24. P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 9 (1975).
25. Id. This status is explicitly recognized in the United States patent law. Id. Thus,
the major theories behind the patent system are incentive and property.
26. Id. at I (Supp. 1979). The specific rationale behind the United States patent law is
the policy that one who has invested time and labor in developing a new product should be
given the benefit of invention by being given the complete right to exclude others from the
enjoyment of his invention. Id.
27. Id. at 9 (1975). The word monopoly is derived from the Greek words meaning
"alone" and "to sell." Id.
28. Id. at 1 (Supp. 1979).
29. Industrial property rights fall within the area of law known as intellectual prop-
erty, i.e., patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets. Industrial property relates to pat-
ents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications
of source of appellations of origin, and repression of unfair competition. Paris Convention,
supra note 1, art. 1(2). Inventor's certificates are a proposed addition to Article 1(2) of the
Convention which sets out the areas protected by the treaty. See WIPO Revision, supra note
9, at 567.
30. The nature of the patent right is to give the patentee, i.e., the inventor, a monop-
oly on his invention for a specified amount of time. The monopoly grant is the right to control
the use of the patent. E.g., Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976). Specifically, 35 U.S.C. §
154 grants a monopoly to a U.S. patentee for seventeen years.
31. A fundamental principle of all intellectual property is that the exclusive right is not
in abstract ideas. Rather, the exclusivity is for the physical embodiment of the idea. P.
ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at 10 (1975). Therefore, although it is essentially intangible, a
patent, as well as other intellectual and industrial property, is an actual property right.
32. Payne & Bagarazzi, Effect of the EEC Rules of Competition on Industrial Property
Rights and Technology Transfer, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LICENSING 245, 245 (A.B.A.
Sec. Pat., Trademark & Copyright L. 1981).
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international industrial property system achieves a balance between
allocating control which spurs incentive to create and preventing
abuse of the control which inhibits technology transfer.
33
B. The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
of 188334 has been the cornerstone of international regulation of
industrial property for nearly a century. 35  The Convention makes
no provision for patentability requirements; these are left to indi-
vidual national legislation.3 6  However, the Convention sets out a
binding framework 37 for its eighty-eight member nations38 (the
33. Id.
34. See Paris Convention, supra note 1. For a history of events leading to the 1883
Convention, see U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 65-72.
35. 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 93 (1981) (editorial). The Berne Convention, and the
Universal Copyright Convention of which the United States is a member, are the main
treaties regarding copyright protection. See generally A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 262-
65 (1979). The Paris Convention is the most important of the multinational agreements on
invention protection. Gerster, Switzerland and the Revision of the Paris Convention, 15 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 111, 118 (1981). For the text of other multinational treaties in this area, see
2B-2J J. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE: PATENT STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND
TREATIES (1981). In the introduction written for the original 1974 edition the author stated:
"the text of the time-honored International Convention [Paris Convention] is published in
these volumes. In spite of the apparently immanent [sic] adoption of the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (which is also reprinted in this book), the older International Convention probably
has a great deal of life left to live." 2B id. at viii.
36. Gerster, supra note 35, at 118. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court regarded the
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as subservient to the Paris Convention and the Madrid Trade-
mark Agreement. Payne & Bagarazzi, supra note 32, at 255-56. These two major treaties
favor the trademark law of the forum state on questions of function, incidents and deceptive
character of a trademark. Id.
37. G. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE
PnOTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 14 (1968); Gerster, supra note 35, at 118. See also Paris
Convention, supra note 1, art. 25 (Article 25 states "[a]ny country party to this Convention
undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its Constitution, the measures necessary to ensure
the application of this Convention."). Despite the great importance of the common basic
rules, members have freedom of action which the developing countries have only recently
started to utilize. Gerster, supra note 35, at 118; Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 15; see
infra note 45.
38. The breakdown of the Union members is as follows. Signatories to the Stockholm
text [entire text]: Australia, Austria, Azores, Belgium, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Denmark (including Faroe Islands), Finland, France (in-
cluding Departments of Guadalupe, Guyane, Martinique, Reunion and all Overseas Territo-
ries), Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana,
Greece, Holy See, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Korea (Democratic People's Republic of ), Korea (Republic of), Lichtenstein, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Madeira, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Nether-
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Paris Union). The Convention has thus far been revised six times; 39
it was most recently revised in 1967. 40  In keeping with the Con-
vention's purpose of protecting industrial property, the rights of
patent holders have been extended with each revision. 41
The two basic substantive rules of the Convention are the
principle of national treatment 42 and the right of priority. 43  Na-
tional treatment means foreign owners of industrial property or
their licensees are entitled to the same treatment accorded nationals
of the country where the foreign owners or licensees have applied
for, or been granted, a patent right. A grantor country extends
national treatment to the citizens of all member nations who are
lands and Netherlands Antilles, Niger, Norway, Portugal with Azores and Madeira, Senegal,
Spain (including Overseas Departments), Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Uganda,
United Kingdom, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vietnam (under exami-
nation), Yugoslavia, Zaire; [bound in part]: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Hungary, Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamaheriya, Malta,
Phillipines, Poland, Romania, South Africa (Republic of), Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Union
Soviet Socialist Republic; Signatories to the Lisbon text [entire text]: Cyprus, Haiti, Iran,
Nigeria, Tanzania (Tanganyika only), Trinidad/Tobago, Zimbabwe; [bound in part]: Ar-
gentina, Bahamas, Malta, Phillipines, Zambia; Signatories to the London text [entire text]:
Curacao, Iceland, Lebanon, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, San Marino, Syrian Arab Repub-
lic; [bound in part]: Canada, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Turkey; Signatories to the Hague text:
Brazil (in part), Dominican Republic, Naura (under question). 2H J. SINNOTT, supra note 35,
at Convention of Paris, at 1-86 (1981). "Non-discrimination means both that there are no
barriers to the entry of foreign patentees into a national market and that, once there, these
patentees are treated in exactly the same way as national patent holders." UNCTAD Secre-
tariat, supra note 1, at 4. See also Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
39. It was revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900; at Washington on June 2, 1911;
at the Hague on November 6, 1925; at London on June 2, 1934; at Libson on October 31,
1958; and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. See supra note 1.
40. Gerster, supra note 35, at 118. For a summary of the revisions through 1958, see U.
ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 72-92. The two basic principles of national treatment and the
right of priority are unchanged. The most important of the Union's evolutionary areas has
been Article 5. Id. at 72 n.23.
41. Gerster, supra note 35, at 118-19. For example, when the Paris Union was founded
almost every member required the patentee to work his invention. Noncompliance resulted in
forfeiture. However, it became evident that the patentee's right would be impeded by the
obligation to work in all Union countries and as the ultimate motive of the Union is
strengthening the patentee's position, the goal of revision became complete abolition of any
requirement to work the patent. Immediate attainment of this goal was not possible, how-
ever, and the intermediate solution was possible compulsory licensing as a sanction for non-
working. U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 99. But see id. at 100 (where the author suggests
that public interests have led to concessions for the less industrialized nations despite the goal
of strong patent protection).
42. WIPO Revision, supra note 9, at 565. It is essentially the equal protection provi-
sion. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.
43. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 4; see U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 70.
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residents of a member nation or have an industrial or commercial
establishment within a member nation. 44  The right of priority is a
grace period which gives the applicant time to decide in which
other countries a patent should be sought. During the period the
applicant is protected in all countries of the Paris Union from the
effect of intervening publications and patent applications.
45
The basic procedural rules of the Convention relate to mem-
bership, revision, and voting. Membership is available to any coun-
try upon unilateral declaration of intent; 46 and a new member must
adhere to the latest revised text. 47  There is a provision for periodic
diplomatic conferences to revise the text. 48  The established prac-
tice required unanimous consent to any amendment; 49 however,
this requirement was never codified. 50  Thus, the developing coun-
tries were able to successfully challenge the requirement of unanim-
ity. 51
44. U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 71.
45. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 24, at 322 (1975). The priority or Convention date is the
first date on which a patent application for a particular invention is made in any member
country. Each member must treat any parallel application filed in its patent office as though
it were made on the Convention date. The act of filing a patent application in one Union
member creates potential rights in all other Union members. However, no rights vest for the
foreign inventor unless and until he complies with the requisite formalities in the member
country where the application was made. Subsequent invalidation of the patent or applica-
tion on which the right of priority is based has no effect on the rights of the patent holder
with respect to his Convention date for this invention. Id. For illustration of this principle,
see id. at 324-25 (1978). The priority period for a patent is twelve months; for a trademark it
is six months. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(C)(1).
The Convention works toward lessening the differences among national patent laws.
This is done through four categories of rules: 1) those of international public law which
regulate the rights and obligations of member states, establish organs of the Union and
facilitate administrative functions. These include, e.g., the provisions concerning ratifica-
tion, accession, and denunciation; 2) the Union rules which require or permit members to
legislate. The right of priority is the most important of these Union rules; 3) those rules of
substantive law which concern the rights and obligations of private parties but only to the
extent of requiring domestic law of the member to be applied, e.g., national treatment; and,
4) substantive law which concerns the rights and obligations of private parties not merely in
the application of domestic laws, but those which may directly govern the situation at issue.
These rules constitute the body of common rules which directly or indirectly must be
respected by all member states. G. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 37, at 10-13.
46. Paris Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20, 21, 24.
47. Id. art. 23. See U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 70.
48. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 18.
49. U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 70.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Since its conception, the foremost purpose of the Convention
has been to achieve uniformity among national patent laws and to
render these laws, in particular the working requirements rules,
more lenient to patent holders. 52  The unanimity rule hampered
the Convention's evolution, 53 thereby leading to revolution by the
developing nations. 54
C. The Current Revision
The developing countries consider the Convention's balance
between the rights of the patentee and the public interest of the
granting member nation to be inequitably weighted toward the
patentee. 55 These countries contend that there is not enough pro-
tection against patent abuse, and that the patent holder has been
protected to the detriment of the social and economic interests of
the developing nations. 56  Consequently, the LDCs propose revi-
sion of the Convention in the areas of national treatment; 57 right of
priority; 58 independence of patents; 5  compulsory licensing and
revocation; 60 and importation of products manufactured by a proc-
ess patented in the importing country.6'
52. U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 227. The thrust of the Convention is not to protect
the patent granting nation, but rather the patentee. See S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, §§ 44-62,
at 59-94.
53. U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 231.
54. See id. at 235. "This uniformity of substantive law of industrial property in what
constitutes almost a third of the world is one of the great blessings of international trade. It
would be a real misfortune for this uniformity to cease to exist. This could gradually happen
because there has been no conscious effort made to date to keep development and evolution as
uniform as practicably possible." S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 1028 at 1880-81.
55. WIPO Revision, supra note 9, at 565. See generally Greer, The Case Against
Patent Systems in Less-Developed Countries, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 223 (1973).
56. See Jeffries, Regulation of Transfer of Technology: An Evaluation of the UNC TAD
Code of Conduct, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 309, 309-10 (1977). See also U. ANDERFELT, supra note
4, 100-02 (discussion of legal versus economic motives in the evolution of the Paris Union).
See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Role of the Patent
System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19
(1974) (discussion of the LDCs, their position in the international industrial property system,
and the Paris Convention).
57. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 2. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying
text for discussion of national treatment.
58. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 4. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying
text for discussion of the right of priority.
59. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 4 bis. See infra notes 111-116 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of independence of patents.
60. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 5. See infra notes 117-138 and accompanying
text for discussion of compulsory licenses and revocation.
61. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 5 quater. See infra notes 139-150 for discussion
of importation.
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The developed countries agreed to revise the Convention 62 and
developing nations expected that their proposals 63 would provide
the basis for the revised text. 64  At the Geneva Conference, how-
ever, the developed countries rejected the proposed draft of the
developing nations, and declared that any favored treatment of the
developing countries could only be transitional.6 5  The developing
nations insist that they be accorded special and preferential treat-
ment as a permanent part of the Paris Convention.16
II. THE CONFLICT
A. The Developing Nations
The tension between the developed and developing nations
intensified when the developing nations organized the Group of
7767 at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD). 68 The Group of 77 is attempting to attack
62. WIPO Revision, supra note 9, at 566.
63. See id. at 565-66 for proposals.
64. See 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 94 (1981) (editorial).
65. Id. See Committee Reports, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
SVMMARY OF PROC. 58; Schuyler, supra note 18, at 2; PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
No. 562, at A-6 (Jan. 14, 1982).
66. See WIPO Revision, supra note 9, at 566.
67. The seventy-seven developing countries joined together to give their demands
greater authority by speaking with one unified voice. The group has expanded to approxi-
mately 120 members. Nossiter, Third World Pact on Sea Is Planned, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1982, at All, col. 1. However, in U.N. terminology it is still known as the Group of 77.
Dorsey, Preferential Treatment: A New Standard for International Economic Relations, 18
HARv. INT'L L.J. 109, 109 n.l. (1977).
68. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, First Session, Group of
77: Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, June 15, 1964, re-
printed in K. SAUVANT, 1 THE GRouP OF 77 at 19-20 (1981). The seventy-seven original
members were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambo-
dia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazza-
ville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indo-
nesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mada-
gascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Republic of Vietnam,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tangan-
yika and Zanzibar, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Id. at 19.
Membership in the Group of 77 is open to developing countries located within Asia,
Africa and Latin America. In exceptional circumstances, the Group of 77 may consider the
application of a developing country outside these three regions if the country concerned has
shown over a sufficient period of time that it has identified with the interests of the Group of
77 and has consistently supported the positions of the Group of 77. Working Group on
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technological dependence, import dependence and foreign involve-
ment 9 through international and local law, 70 including revision of
the Paris Convention. 7' Fifty-five of the lesser developed countries
belong to the Paris Union. 72  It is by means of this majority that the
Group of 77 plan to change their status with respect to the Conven-
tion. 73  Many LDCs consider that the "new economic order"7 4
justifies their harsh attacks on the international legal systems of
intellectual property protection.75
Membership: Report on Procedures for the Admission of New Members to the Group of 77
and on Membership of the Group, Geneva, April 28, 1976, reprinted in 3 K. SAUVANT, supra,
at 83.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was the first inter-
national organization devoted to aiding developing countries, especially in the growing
conflict between the developing and developed nations of the world. See generally B.
Gosovic, UNCTAD: CONFLICr AND COMPROMISE (1972). The UNCTAD Secretariat has
participated in the Convention revision by preparing a report from the perspective of the
developing countries. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report of the
Group of Governmental Experts on the Role of the Industrial Property System in the Transfer
of Technology, U.N. Doe. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/4 alternatively numbered U.N. Doe. TD/B/C.6/
24 (1977).
69. See infra note 78.
70. For a discussion of Mexico's national legislation as a reaction to the problem of
LDC transfer of technology, see Comment, Multinational Corporations and Lesser Devel-
oped Countries-Foreign Investment, Transfer of Technology, and the Paris Convention:
Caveat Investor, 5 DAYTON L. REV. 105, 116-30 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Caveat Investor].
For a discussion of Switzerland's solution of bilateral treaties, see Gerster, supra note 35, at
111-18.
71. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The International Patent
System as an Instrument of Policy for National Development (Provisional Agenda Item 3(b))
at 29-30, U.N. Doe. TD/B/C.6/AC.2/3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Instrument of Policy].
72. Gerster, supra note 35, at 118.
73. See supra note 18. See also Dorsey, supra note 67, at 115 n.21.
74. United Nations resolutions call for a "new economic order." G.A. Res. 3201, S-6
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doe. A/9559 (1974); G.A. Res. 3202, S-6 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 1) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). See also G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) ("new economic" charter of rights and duties). See
also Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature
of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L
L. 247 (1978) (discussion of proposals by the "new order" of Codes of Conduct to balance the
bargaining power in international commerce). See generally Murphy, Decision 24, Mexicani-
zation, and the New International Economic Order: The Anatomy of Disincentive, 13 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 289, 298-302 (1978) (discussion of the "new economic order"). The U.N. docu-
ments asserting the "new economic order" essentially admonish the developed nations to
provide preferential and nonreciprocal treatment to developing countries particularly with
respect to economic and social development and technological progress. Id. at 298-99.
Certain proposals to implement the "new economic order," especially in dealings with MNCs
are covered in Codes of Conduct, e.g., the UNCTAD Code of Conduct. Davidow & Chiles,
supra, at 252-53. See generally Jeffries, supra note 56 (discussion of the UNCTAD Code of
Conduct).
75. Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3202, S-6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
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The LDCs own only one percent of the world's patents, yet
grant monopolistic rights to foreign patentees. 76  The Group of 77
asserts that the present system thereby grants preferences to foreign
patentees within the LDCs' market. 77  The technology and capital
gaps between the LDCs and developed nations undoubtedly will
continue under this system unless steps are taken to alleviate
them .78
B. The Developed Nations
At present, the number of LDC Union members exceeds the
number of developed country members; 79 however, the developed
countries are the significant patentees and, until the recent chal-
lenge, were the controlling force in the Paris Union. 80 In United
Nations terminology the developed countries are labelled Group
B. l These countries operate their technology transfer through
76. Ewing, UNCTAD and the Transfer of Technology, 10J. WORLD TRADE L. 197, 199
(1976). In most of the developing nations a huge percentage of patents are sought out by
foreigners. Even in some developed countries, however, foreigners file a greater percentage of
applications than those filed by nationals. The reason probably is that inventions of the world
outnumber inventions within a country. The possible explanation for the low number of
applications by nationals within developing nations is the absence of technological back-
ground in research, education, and training. S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 1030, at 1886. The
LDCs are interested in being included in the industrial property system because as their
industrialization and inventive capacity increases their inventors will need universal protec-
tion. 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 94 (1981) (editorial).
77. Instrument of Policy, supra note 71, at 28. UNCTAD considers the Convention to
have become a "reverse system of preferences granted to foreign patent holders in the markets
of developing countries." Id. See also UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1 (proposals by the
Secretariat on behalf of LDCs).
78. Hart, The Capital Gap and the Transfer of Technology, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN LICENSING 235, 235 (A.B.A. Sec. Pat., Trademark & Copyright L. 1981). The LDCs often
lack necessary development resources in human, technological, and economic areas. They are
hampered by poverty, illiteracy, political unrest, and inflation. Furthermore, fear of domi-
nation causes LDCs to be reluctant to accept capital from developed countries for technology
research and development. Id. at 235-36.
79. Fifty-five of the eighty-eight member nations are LDCs. Gerster, supra note 35, at
118.,
80. Jeffries, supra note 56, at 326 n.92.
81. WIPO Revision, supra note 9, at 567. This corresponds to the terms "Group of 77"
used for developing countries and "Group D" used for the socialist countries. China does not
belong to any group. Id. Yugoslavia is not a member of Group D. Jeffries, supra note 56, at
309 n. 1. The developed nations are often termed industrialized countries.
This Comment concentrates on the United States position regarding the current revision.
A problem faced by the United States is that the Group B nations are not taking a unified
stand with respect to the Convention revision (unlike the developing countries). This Com-
ment does not intend to suggest that the United States position is identical to that of all other
Group B nations.
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multinational corporations (MNCs) .82 The Group B countries ad-
here to the ideas of reciprocity and equal treatment under interna-
tional conventions.8 3  The developed countries consider that the
main purpose of treaties such as the Paris Convention is not the
transfer of technology as suggested by the Group of 77; rather, it is
effective protection of industrial property. 84  One noted commen-
tator has proposed 85 that the "misconceived documentation" on
industrial property rights by the United Nations and its agencies,
e.g., UNCTAD, which favors developing countries, be ignored.8"
III. REVISION POSITIONS
The following five areas have remained unresolved by the
Diplomatic Conferences on Revision. The LDC viewpoint will be
juxtaposed with that of the United States.
A. National Treatment
The LDCs are not suggesting that the principle of national
treatment 87 be eliminated. Rather, they recommend less rigid ap-
plication of the principle to LDCs, to be accomplished by excep-
tions within the Convention.88 They argue that this preferential
82. Jeffries, supra note 56, at 309 n.3; Caveat Investor, supra note 70, at 105 n.l.
MNCs are sometimes referred to as multinational enterprises (MNEs), transnational corpora-
tions (TNCs), or transnational enterprises (TNEs). The terms are often used interchangeably
although some scholars draw distinctions among the terms. Id.; Davidow & Chiles, supra
note 74, at 247-48.
83. Harris, supra note 7, at 225-26.
84. Id. at 219.
A good legal system of industrial property in a developing country would not
necessarily guarantee a ready access to technology, but a bad system may seriously
impede it, because it is a factor in the element of confidence and legal security
which stimulates investment.
In this connection, nonadherence of a developing country to a treaty arrange-
ment that gives adequate protection to foreign rights of industrial property is an
impediment to economic development. It is undeniable that the Paris Convention is
the best existing international system of such protection.
S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 1030, at 1885.
85. The proposal is by Bryan Harris, head of the Intellectual Property Law Division of
the Commission of European Communities and author of the work cited supra note 7.
86. Harris, supra note 7, at 224.
87. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
88. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 25-26. For example, some exceptions might
be duration periods for patent grants, standards for revocation and compulsory licensing and
fee schedules. Id. at 26.
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treatment is necessary to overcome industrial property domination
by developed countries. 89
The United States position ° emphasizes that this principle is
essential to the Convention.91 Therefore, it seems that a system of
preferential treatment in this area is irrational, and effectively
eliminates the Convention. The United States proposes the employ-
ment of a technology transfer expert to negotiate for the LDCs in
dealings with MNCs.9 2  It also advocates national promotion of
local inventions which will result in benefits to LDCs.9 3 New local
technology would result in increased local employment, an im-
proved economy, and access to the subsidiary knowledge required
to work the technology after patent expiration.9 4  The United
States contends that such a system of local development can be
implemented within the existing principle of national treatment.9 5
B. Right of Priority
The UNCTAD Secretariat has made a number of suggestions
regarding the priority right 6 which are aimed at benefitting
LDCs.07  First, the Secretariat recommends that the priority pe-
89. Dorsey, supra note 67, at 116; see also U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 265-66
(Anderfelt suggests that there are two forms within which preferential treatment could be
offered to LDCs and that both options have been illustrated in the international copyright
field).
90. The position espoused in this Comment is based on the comments of the United
States group of experts in response to the UNCTAD Secretariat's proposals. United States of
America: Preliminary Comments on the Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat (TD/B/C.6/
AC.3/2), U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/4/Add.1 Annex V (1977) [hereinafter cited as United
States Comments]; see also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, List of
Participants, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/INF.1 (1975) (advisors and experts named).
91. United States Comments, supra note 90, at 22.
92. Id. at 7; see also Hart, supra note 78, at 235 (the author suggests that the
developing nations lack the expertise, and more importantly, the wisdom, to decide which
technologies are appropriate to accommodate their needs); S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 1032,
at 1891-92 (the author suggests that the real problem in some cases is not technology transfer,
but rather adaptation of foreign imported technology to the needs of the developing nations).
There is doubt that these countries can adapt if left to themselves; the author enumerates the
reasons for this. Id.
93. United States Comments, supra note 90, at 22.
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. Distinctions in treatment based upon the invention origin can be used to
encourage local research and development yet remain consistent with the current Convention
provision for national treatment. Id.
96. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
97. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 19-21.
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riod should be reduced.98 The rationale for this suggestion is the
existence of modern means of communication which were not
available when the right originated in 1883.11 These methods have
rendered a long priority period unnecessary. 00 Second UNCTAD
recommends that the priority period should not be applied against
third parties who in good faith have begun exploitation of an
invention which is identical to one for which priority is claimed,
but which has not been disclosed or published. 01 The Secretariat
contends that it is unjust to force a third party to stop use of his
invention. 0 2 Third, the Secretariat suggests that preferential treat-
ment should be granted to LDC national inventors who in good
faith 10 3 apply for a patent during the priority period of a foreign
applicant. 0 4 Alternatively, the national inventor would be unable
to patent his invention, resulting in disincentive for national inven-
tors. 10 5  Finally, the Secretariat proposed that preferential treat-
ment should also be considered in regard to the period of priority
for inventions originating in LDCs. 0
The United States argues that UNCTAD's conclusions that
priority rights create a disincentive for LDC researchers is unten-
able since patent rights inherently discourage research and develop-
98. Id. at 21.
99. Id. at 19. The 1883 priority period was six months, It is currently twelve months.
Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Exploitation of a patent involves the sale, use, and licensing of the invention
by the owner. Disclosure or publication occurs when the existence of a patent on an invention
becomes known. Thus a national inventor may spend time and money exploiting an inven-
tion for which there is a patent application in another country, but which is not disclosed to
the national.
102. Id. at 20.
103. "Good faith" is not defined by the Secretariat; however, assuming that UNCTAD
wants the least rigid requirements for LDCs, good faith in this context most likely means that
the national inventor has no prior knowledge of the foreign patentee's invention and no
extensive search for foreign inventions is necessary.
104. Id. at 21.
105. Id. at 20. The national inventor would be unable to patent his invention as a
result of the foreign patentee's application, thus the national inventor's investment of time,
money and energy would be useless even though the foreign patentee's application was
unknown to him. However, this may be a false argument in light of the disincentive nature of
the patent system as a whole. A better argument for preferential treatment in this situation
may be that given the different conditions under which the LDC inventor must work, it is
only fair to give him extra time to file.
106. Id. at 21.
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ment. 10 7  The United States argues that in practice it is rare that
two applications for one invention are filed within the same one
year period. 08 However, this seems to be a false argument in light
of the need for an "interference area" in the practice of patent
law. 09 Finally, the United States argues that a reduction in the
period would contribute to the number of unworked patents in
LDCs.l"0
C. Independence of Patents
The principle of independence of patents provides that the
substantive requirements in one member nation are independent of
the requirements in other member nations of the Paris Union."' A
resulting problem is that forfeiture, expiration, or nullity of a pat-
ent in one member nation does not cause forfeiture of the patent in
another member nation." 2  This can have a detrimental effect on
the first grantor country, particularly on LDCs which do not have
the technical staff necessary for a searching examination of an
application." 3  Consequently, the LDCs advocate a compulsory
107. United States Comments, supra note 90, at 17. The consideration here is the
distinct possibility of another inventor being second.
108. Id. at 18. For example, in the United States over 100,000 patent applications are
filed annually, yet fewer than 400 instances of conflicting United States applications for the
same invention arise in a year. Id. See also S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, §§ 252-53, at 445-54
(general statistics on international patents).
109. The adversary proceeding in the Patent Office is known as an interference and is
designed to determine which of the rival claimants is the first in time. In the United States the
determination involves the dates of conception and reduction to practice as well as the
diligence of the first to conceive and the last to reduce to practice during the overlapping
period. H. WIKSTnOM, PATENT INTERFERENCE PRACTICE 9 (1965); see also A.W. DELLER, 8
DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 604-05 (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981) (text and cases on
interference practice in general and the characteristics of interfering patents).
110. United States Comments, supra note 90, at 19.
111. Paris Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4 bis; see also S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, §
171, at 272 (further explanation of principle of the independence of patents).
112. S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 171, at 272.
113. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 22. In most countries the official scrutiny,
i.e., the examination, is delegated to the patent office which is an administrative agency of
the government. Those countries that pass upon the novelty of the inventions submitted to
their patent offices have an examination system; those countries which do not make a
determination on novelty before granting the patent have a registration system. Even in these
latter countries, however, the applications are screened for compliance with form. P. ROSEN-
BERc, supra note 24, at 336-37 (1975). The examination is in two stages: 1) search and
retrieval of relevant prior art; 2) application of that prior art to the subject matter of the
invention involving administrative determination of patentability. Id. at 338.
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information exchange whereby the country of initial application
must inform other countries of the results of its examination.
1 4
The United States position on this point is not radically differ-
ent from that of the LDCs. A compulsory exchange of information
is also advocated by the United States. However, it notes that only
certain information" 5 should be included, and thus the provision
should be carefully drafted to avoid the exchange of irrelevent
information. 1"
D. Compulsory Licensing and Revocation
The patent right is a monopoly. " 7  The two basic protections
against abuse of the right are the compulsory license"' and the
revocation of the patent" 9 for insufficient or non-use. In the opin-
ion of the UNCTAD Secretariat, however, the Convention renders
these two remedies ineffective against MNC monopoly abuses such
as the non-working of the patent, the charging of excessive royal-
ties, or the forcing of restrictions upon a licensee.12 0
A compulsory license is an involuntary grant of use of the
patent by the patent holder.' 2' Three major problems plague the
application of this remedy. First, a country may require a patentee
to grant a compulsory license for insufficient working of a patent,
but it may do so only four years after the application date or three
years after the patent grant, whichever is later. 122  Second, there is
a prohibition against granting a compulsory license if the patent
114. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 23. The report also suggests that results of
validity of patent litigation should be exchanged. Id.
115. The areas of novelty and obviousness are suggested. United States Comments,
supra note 90, at 20. The United States Patent Office is not equipped to handle a voluminous
exhange of information. Id.
116. Id. Note that the present text of the Convention does not prevent a country from
requiring such information from an applicant. Id. Canada does require submission of various
information. Id.
117. S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 1, § 4, at 2, 5-6.
118. Id. §§ 16-17, at 25. Most developing countries and all developed countries, except
the United States, have compulsory license provisions in their patent statutes. Note, Is A
Compulsory Patent Licensing Statute Necessary? A Study of the U.S. and Foreign Experi-
ence, 7 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1207, 1207 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Is Compulsory
Licensing Necessary?]
119. S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, §§ 16-17, at 25.
120. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 9-14.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(A)(4).
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holder justifies his lack of use by "legitimate reason."'1 23  UNCTAD
seeks a better definition of this concept in order to achieve an
applicable standard for the defense. 124  Third, the patent holder is
not required to disclose the know-how of the patent's operation.125
The Secretariat contends that unless disclosure is mandatory, this
subsidiary knowledge will not be transferred to those willing to
work the patent.126
There are problems with the revocation procedure as well. A
grantor country may not revoke a patent unless the grant of a
compulsory license would be insufficient to prevent abuse. 127  Fur-
thermore, the grantor may not institute forfeiture proceedings until
two years after the first compulsory license.12 The LDCs conclude
that this is a disadvantage to the grantor country because that
country is not exposed to the technology until it is of little or no
value. 1
29
UNCTAD concedes that the compulsory license remedy is of
minimal value. 130  However, the United States contends that the
ineffectiveness of the remedy is not in the Convention text; rather,
compulsory license provisions are rarely enforced, "' and compul-
sory licenses are seldom granted. 132  The United States points out
123. Id. There is no standard for "legitimate reasons."
124. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 12.
125. Id.
126. Id. See generally Is Compulsory Licensing Necessary?, supra note 118.
127. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(A)(3).
128. Id.
129. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 12. The idea here is that the technology
will become outdated. See generally Is Compulsory Licensing Necessary?, supra note 118.
130. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 10. But see Is Compulsory Licensing
Necessary?, supra note 118, at 1211. Because of the many factors involved, such as national
needs, priorities, the technological status of a country, and the criteria used by various
countries, it is difficult to assess the impact of the compulsory license in correcting patent
abuses. Id.
131. See Henry, Multinational Practice in Determining Provisions in Compulsory
Patent Licenses, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 325, 326-27 (1976).
132. United States Comments, supra note 90, at 12. But see Is Compulsory Licensing
Necessary?, supra note 118, at 1211. The author advances seven arguments against a compul-
sory license: 1) it violates a property right; 2) it undermines the value of patents as an
incentive to investments; 3) it hurts a large company which cannot recoup losses on frequent
and costly failures; 4) it hurts a small company by forcing it to license a large company with
which it cannot compete; 5) it calls for difficult-to-compute royalties which are lower than
those available from arm's-length bargaining; 6) it is ineffective as a remedy for undesired,
anti-competitive business practices; and 7) it precipitates unilateral and bilateral trade
barriers. Id.
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that a grace period for working a patent is a practical necessity;
often the full value of a particular technology 133 is not realized at
the time of conception. 134  Furthermore, it contends that the con-
vention is flexible and is currently capable of meeting the needs of
LDCs. 135  In fact, it is argued that redefinition of "legitimate rea-
sons" will narrow the defense and, therefore, is inconsistent with
the request for more flexibility toward LDCs. 136  A stricter stand-
ard would inhibit transfer of technology. 37  Finally, the United
States suggests that the rare issuance of a compulsory license proves
its success as an incentive for a patent holder to work a patent or
grant a compulsory license. 13
E. Importation of Products Manufactured by a
Process Patented in the Importing Country
Article 5 quater of the Convention prescribes that the grantor
country must apply its national law on infringement in the case of
importation of products that are manufactured according to the
process patented in the importing country. This is true even though
the product is manufactured in another country, and the process is
not patented in that other country. 39  The protection extends to
the sale and use of the products directly manufactured by the
process.140  This provision 141 is an exception to the general freedom
133. For example, the successes of penicillin, the helicopter, and the ballpoint pen
were not realized until many years after their development. United States Comments, supra
note 90, at 12.
134, Id.
135. Id. at 10.
136. The United States experts suggest that redefinition would impose a harsh and
arbitrary standard on patentees who had valid reasons for not working their patents. Id. at
13.
137. The redefinition would result in a disincentive to potential patentees to patent
their inventions. Less technology would be transferred to countries using the new standard.
See Harris, supra note 7, at 226.
138, United States Comments, supra note 90, at 12-13; see Cohen, Compulsory Li-
censing of Inventions- The Paris Convention Model, 20 IDEA 153, 189 (1979).
139. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 5 quater; G. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 37, at
85; S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 232, at 395.
140, C. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 37, at 85; S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 232, at 395.
141, Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 5 quater. Article 5 quater states:
When a product is imported into a country of the Union where there exists a patent
protecting a process of manufacture of the said product, the patentee shall have all
the rights with regard to the imported product, that are accorded to him by the
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to legislate national laws regarding infringement. 142  Furthermore,
the current text provides that products manufactured in any mem-
ber country which are imported by the patentee into the country
granting the patent shall not cause forfeiture of the patent.143
UNCTAD contends, however, that the importation is not the work-
ing of a patent, and that this provision merely grants an importa-
tion monopoly to the holder of a domestic monopoly, adding to the
problem of non-use of patents. 44
The United States sees no reason to modify this provision. Most
inventions are not patented in LDCs,145 therefore, the products
derived from patents in other countries are available to LDCs,146
and the added protection to imports is irrelevant. Furthermore,
without protection against imports, a patent holder may not be
able to establish local working.147  The exclusion of infringing im-
ports is necessary to continue local manufacture. 4 8
The United States also does not see a reason to delete this
provision. It argues that if a patented process is not worked the
patent should be licensed or revoked, and again importation of the
product by the patentee is irrelevant. 49  Similarly, if a patent is
worked, then importation by the patentee should not cause revoca-
tion. Revocation should follow non-use, not importation. Deletion
of this provision may discourage technology transfer by prohibiting
necessary importation. 15 0
legislation of the country of importation, on the basis of the process patent, with
respect to products manufactured in that country.
Id.
142. S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 232, at 395. The article does not mandate that all
processes or products must be granted patent protection. Rather, the point is that the rights of
a product or process which is protected should not be circumvented by importation.
143. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(A)(1).
144. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 15-18. The Secretariat suggests that the
advantages of domestic production, local employment, the attainment of experience and
know-how, and capital outflow do not arise when the product is imported. Id. Article 5
quater encourages failure to work a process patent and creates price increases without a
transfer of technology. Gerster, supra note 35, at 121. The request to eliminate the provision
or not apply it to LDCs is justified on the idea that it strengthens import monopolies of
foreign multinationals. Id.
145. United States Comments, supra note 90, at 8.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 16.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 17.
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F. Summary
One noted commentator suggests that the only possible ap-
proach to eliminating the gap between developing and developed
nations is for the LDCs to obtain unilateral concessions from the
other Union members.' 51 It was thought that a unified challenge
to the dominant position of the developed countries would result in
cooperation for changes to the present system. 52 The developed
countries, and in particular the United States, have not placidly
accepted the proposed changes.15 3
Radical unilateral change is a solution which results in unde-
sired disincentives. 15 4  As stated by a high official in the area of
European intellectual property: "If intellectual property is inade-
quately protected, it cannot be adequately rewarded; and, if it
cannot be adequately rewarded, it is far less likely to be forthcom-
ing."155
IV. DENUNCIATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
A. The Convention
The Paris Convention is a treaty of unlimited duration15
which any member country can denounce by notifying the Director
General; 57 withdrawal takes effect one year after the day of receipt
of notification. 158 Unilateral denunciation of the Convention auto-
matically applies to all texts so that a country which denounces the
Convention leaves it entirely. Furthermore, denunciation by one
country has no effect on the other members and the Convention
remains in full force. 51 A country may not exercise the right of
denunciation unless it has been a member for at least five years. 160
151. U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 230.
152. Id. at 230-31.
153. See 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 94 (1981) (editorial); Schuyler, supra note 18, at 3
(recommends a United States campaign to modify the positions of the other developed
countries, the more industrialized developing countries, and select socialist countries).
154. See S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 1030, at 1884-85.
155. Harris, supra note 7, at 227.
156. Paris Convention, supra note 1, art. 26 (1).
157. Id. art. 26 (2).
158. Id. art. 26 (3).
159. Id. art. 26 (2).
160. Id. art. 26 (4). A proposed revision eliminated this restriction, leaving only the
one year notification requirement. However, the United States experts view these proposals
as undesirable or stale. United States Comments, supra note 90, at 24.
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Technically, the United States has the right to denounce the
Paris Convention."6 However, to do so in anticipation of estab-
lishing a new treaty modeled after the current convention 162 is
unrealistic if not destructive of the world industrial property sys-
tem. 16 3 Although the LDCs will undoubtedly feel the loss of United
States industrialization, the Convention will technically continue in
effect. Without the strong opposition of the United States, the
Group of 77 will come to dominate the Paris Union and will
introduce the program of preferential treatment.
All of the Group B countries must denounce the Convention if
this action is to have significant effect on the developing countries.
Although a minority in membership, the developed countries con-
trol the world's industrial property.16 4  Uniform Group B action is
not forthcoming;165 but in any event such a break will destroy
universal protection of industrial property. Some alternatives less
radical than denunciation should be examined.
B. International Law
A fundamental and universal principle of international law is
pacta sunt servanda which demands that rights and obligations of a
treaty agreed to by signature, ratification, or accession must be
respected. 1' There are, however, doctrines which may render
written agreements nonbinding. 167
161. See generally Comment, Termination of Treaties as a Political Question: the Role
of Congress After Goldwater v. Carter, 4 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 81 (1980) (for a discussion of
which branch of the U.S. government has the legal right and authority to terminate treaties).
162. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 543, at A-1 (Aug. 27, 1981); Resolu-
tion 606-A, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF PRoc. 34;
Committee Reports, 1981 A.B.A. SEc. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF PROC.
58.
163. In moving for the adoption of Resolution 606-A, Mr. Donald W. Banner, an
advisor to the Geneva Conference U.S. Delegation stated "[t]his resolution does not say that
we should leave the Paris Convention. It merely says that we should look to where we will be
when the Paris Convention is over." Committee Reports, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF Paoc. 58. It is inadvisable for the United States to conduct its
affairs as if the Convention will soon end.
164. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 1, at 2.
165. Speaking in favor of Resolution 606-A, Mr. Robert B. Benson, another Geneva
advisor states "[t]hey are forcing things through on us, and we are in fact standing alone."
Committee Reports, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF PROC.
58.
166. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 999 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
167. B. SINH, UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION OF TREATY 77-78 (1966); Kunz, The Mean-
ing and the Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 180 (1945); T. ELIAS,
THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 40 (1974).
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1. Rebus Sic Stantibus
Rebus sic stantibus is the recognized rule of international law
that certain changes in circumstances will be grounds for termina-
tion of a treaty or a treaty obligation.16 8  The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties1"9 (Vienna Convention) codified the doc-
trine's limits. 170
According to the Vienna Convention, five conditions must be
present in order for the doctrine to apply: first, the change in
circumstances must relate to conditions existing at the time the
treaty is to be concluded; second, it must be a fundamental change;
third, it must be a change unforeseen by the parties; fourth, the
original circumstances must have constituted an essential basis of
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and, fifth, the
change in circumstances must have radically transformed the scope
of obligations remaining to be performed under the treaty.1 7' The
World Court defined fundamental changes as those which imperil
the existence or vital development of one of the parties.17 2
The United States could argue that the proposed changes from
strict protection of the patentee to preferential treatment for LDCs
168. Toth, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Law (pts. 1-3), JUn10.
REv. 56, 147, 263, at 56 (1974). The principle is analogous to the contract law doctrine that
frustration of purpose operates to excuse failure of performance, or to terminate the contract.
See J. CALAMAEU & J. PERILLO, CONTMACTS §§ 13-10 to 13-13 (2d ed. 1977); U.C.C. § 2-615
(1978); Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM. J.
INT'L L. 895 (1967). Customary international law is the constant and uniform practices of
nations. It must be accompanied by the conviction that the Iaction is the exercise of a right or
fullfillment of an obligation guaranteed or required by law; furthermore, the international
community must acquiesce to or recognize the practice. Toth, supra, at 148. Treaties are a
second source of international law; general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
are a third source; case law, opinions of scholars, and writings of jurists are the fourth source.
Kunz, supra note 167, at 180.
169. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679 (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
170. Toth, supra note 168, at 163-64. The Vienna Convention not only defines the
rules relating to the termination or suspension of treaties, but replaces the rules of customary
international law of treaties. As a result, rebus sic stantibus is now a recognized rule of
international law. Id. The Vienna Convention prefers that the doctrine not be unilaterally
invoked. The invoking party must give notice to the affected parties, must attempt amicable
negotiations, and then utilize judicial or arbitration proceedings. Vienna Convention, supra
note 169, arts. 65-66. See also Toth, supra note 168, at 168.
171. Vienna Convention, supra note 169, art. 62 (1).
172. Id. art. 62. The World Court has found the major requirements of the doctrine to
be the existence of a fundamental change of circumstances and the radical transformation of
the scope of requirements imposed by the treaty. Toth, supra note 168, at 171-76.
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meets the first, fourth and fifth requirements for invoking the
doctrine. The third requirement is also easily met. The Vienna
Convention only requires that the change be unforeseen, not un-
foreseeable.1 73 This is narrower than the traditional legal foresee-
ability test 174 because almost anything is foreseeable, but almost
nothing is actually foreseen.
The second requirement, however, may be the obstacle.
Whether the change is fundamental in the legal sense is question-
able. The Group of 77 argues that preferential treatment will not
imperil Group B's existence or development. Although the domi-
nance of the industrialized nations would be undermined, this is
merely a balancing of the equities according to the LDCs. The
developing countries contend that their vital development will be
impaired without the implementation of the preferential treatment
program.
The United States position is that institution of preferential
treatment will imperil Group B, and furthermore, that the entire
protective system for industrial property is at stake. Incentive for
LDC and MNC inventors alike will be endangered if these revisions
occur. ' 75  However, if the World Court does not accept the argu-
ment that there has been a vital change in circumstances, then
there is no rebus sic stantibus justification for termination of the
Paris Convention.176
2. Jus Cogens
Jus cogens is the norm that a treaty is void if it conflicts with
international law. 177  If a new norm of general international law
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with it is considered
173. Vienna Convention, supra note 169, art. 62 (1).
174. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (4th ed. 1971)
(foreseeable consequences).
175. See S.P. LADAS, supra note 7, § 1030, at 1884-86. Another potential United States
argument is that local LDC legislation may violate the Convention. See, e.g., Gansser, supra
note 7, at 149-70.
176. If it is certain or reasonably expected that the change of circumstances is tempo-
rary, the legal consequences of the doctrine may be to suspend operation of the treaty during
this period of change. Toth, supra note 168, at 272.
177. Vienna Convention, supra note 169, art. 53. A norm of international law is one
which is recognized by the international community as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted. Id.
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terminated.7 8 The concept of a jus cogens is surrounded by con-
troversy.179  It is rare that a treaty has been declared invalid as a
result of being found repugnant to a peremptory rule of interna-
tional law. 180
Nevertheless, the United States may argue that the preferential
treatment proposed by the Group of 77 on behalf of the "new
economic order" is a new peremptory norm of international law. It
is unlikely, however, that at this time the proposed changes could
be considered peremptory by the international community as a
whole.' 8' Thus the requirements for a jus cogens would not be
met. 182
3. Unequal Treaties
Unilateral termination of international agreements, and doc-
trines relating to it have had a long and troublesome history. 18 3
The right to unilateral termination remains controversial. 8 4
Inequality as a ground for the invalidation or termination of a
treaty is not listed in the Vienna Convention.' 85  Nevertheless,
governments frequently state that agreements tainted with inequal-
ity are void.8 6  In an unequal treaty, members do not make recip-
rocal promises; an unequal alliance means a difference in the status
of the contracting parties. 8 7  A contextual inequality results in the
178. Id. art. 64. A norm of general international law is a peremptory legal rule having
applicability in the international community because it is accepted by them as binding. C.
RozAms, THE CONCEPT OF JUs COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 55 (1976). A particular jus
cogens norm is valid unless it violates a general ]us cogens norm. Otherwise, an internation-
ally intolerable dualism would be created. Id. at 56.
179. C. RozAKis, supra note 178, at 2-3.
180. Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Ius Cogens as Formulated by the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 946, 949-50 (1967). At the Nuremburg trials a jus
cogens was found in the rule of international law prohibiting employment of prisoners of war
for work directly relating to war operations. Caveat Investor, supra note 70, at 135.
181. See Toth, supra note 168, at 148, 168, 280.
182. See generally C. RozAlus, supra note 178 (further discussion of jus cogens require-
ments).
183. A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION 3 (1975) (for history review).
184. Id. See generally B. SINH, supra note 167 (further discussion of unilateral termi-
nation).
185. A. DAVID, supra note 183, at 301.
186. Id. Factors which legally attain this result are not specified by governments or
commentators. Sovereign inequality, coercion, and changing conditions are considered as
factors applying to unequal agreements. Id.
187. Id. at 303.
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objecting side being unable to confine retaliation to the alleged
treaty violation within treaty remedies. 88  The objecting side is
thereby forced to take punitive actions.
The legal validity of unequal treaties is unsettled,"18 and there-
fore, it is unlikely to be a successful vehicle for the United States in
the Paris Convention conflict.
V. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TO
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
A. Technology Transfer
The motives behind technology transfer are altruism, i.e., re-
distribution of wealth, and commerce, i.e., promotion of business
interests. 190 Property law and political considerations underlie the
industrial property system.' 9 ' Although the developed nations may
desire to aid the developing nations, nevertheless, it is the Conven-
tion delegate's main duty to represent his country.9 2  Personal
altruistic motives must be put aside in favor of the business, people,
and economy of his nation. 9 3  Furthermore, the technology con-
cerned does not usually belong to the government; rather it is
owned by the individuals and firms of the country which the dele-
gate to the revision conference represents.9 4
The industrial property system is a system of property owner-
ship; technology transfer is a mere part of the system.195  The
industrial property system must be judged in its entirety and not by
individual components. 196 The major purpose of the intellectual
property system is efficient protection of the rights involved, not
technology transfer. 97 Therefore, the United States cannot afford
188. Id. at 305.
189. Id. at 301-06.
190. Harris, supra note 7, at 219.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Lall, The Patent System and the Transfer of Technology to Less-Developed
Countries, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 15 (1976).
196. Id.
197. Harris, supra note 7, at 227. "Human genius is the source of all works of art and
invention. These works are the guarantee of a life worthy of men. It is the duty of the state to
ensure with diligence the protection of the arts and invention." Gansser, supra note 7, at 141-
42 (quoting the inscription which adorns the entrance hall of the World Intellectual Property
Organization building in Geneva).
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to be altruistic to the detriment of industrial property protection,
incentive, or private enterprise.
B. The Paris Convention
One well known patent authority has stated that the Paris
Convention "has been one of the finest pieces of international legis-
lation regulating our world and ensuring equality of treatment in
large and small countries alike."198 The majority of international
lawyers has not recognized the preferential treatment program,1 99
recognizing "the inherent tendency of every legal system [is] to
protect the vested interests with which it has become familiar." 200
Protection of the technology owned by United States inventors
and MNCs is the motive for United States membership in the Paris
Union. Means of persuading the private owners of industrial prop-
erty to part with their rights exist, such as financial inducement,
legal pressure, or expropriation; 201 however, these measures are not
within the contemplation of the United States.20 2
CONCLUSION
Rapid transfer of industrial property from the developed to the
developing countries is analogous to the transfer of real property
from the rich to the poor. By United States standards, a state policy
preserving private rights should be the primary concern.2 0 3 Sena-
tor Moynihan, former Ambassador to India, has commented gener-
ally on the problem:
This is our circumstance. We are a minority. We are outvoted.
This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation.
The question is what do we make of it. So far we have made
little-nothing-of what is in fact an opportunity. We go about
dazed that the world has changed. We toy with the idea of
stopping it and getting off. We rebound with the thought that if
only we are more reasonable perhaps "they" will be. (Almost to
the end, dominant opinion in the U.S. Mission to the United
198. U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 236 (quoting Ladas, The Fundamental Bases of
the International Protection of Industrial Property, P.I., 70: annex, April 1954, at 4).
199. U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 234.
200. C. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 85 (1958).
201. Harris, supra note 7, at 219.
202. See Schuyler, supra note 18, at 3.
203. Harris, supra note 7, at 218.
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Nations was that the United States could not vote against the
"have-nots" by opposing the Charter on the Rights and Duties of
States-all rights for the Group of 77 and no duties.) But "they"
do not grow reasonable. 20 4
The United States cannot donate its technology; United States in-
ventors and MNCs expect and deserve fair and full protection of
their investments.20 5 It is the responsibility of United States law-
yers to ensure this protection within the industrial property system.
The proposed preferential treatment program is an impractical
solution to the problems of LDCs. The complex and longstanding
problems plaguing the developing countries may require changes in
the system, but rapid and unequal changes are no remedy. The
consequences of such a program are not foreseeable and could be
disastrous. Therefore, the United States must oppose the system of
preferential treatment.
The United States should avoid denunciation of the Conven-
tion. The developing countries exert intense pressure because they
constitute a majority. Furthermore, the United Nations and its
special agencies, such as UNCTAD and WIPO, by articulating the
need for technology transfer for LDCs have raised the social con-
sciousness of the international community toward the problems of
the developing countries. Because the United States with the other
Group B nations dominates the ownership and control of the
world's industrial property, the United States should be able to
exploit these property rights to strengthen its position against the
LDCs seeking to gain technology control.
However, if the system of preferential treatment is adopted as
part of the Paris Convention, the purpose of the Convention would
be technology transfer, not universal protection of industrial prop-
erty. Under these circumstances, any possible motive for United
States membership would be eliminated, and the United States
would have no alternative but to denounce the Paris Convention.
Regina A. Loughran
204. Moynihan, The United States In Opposition, 59 COMMENTARY 31, 41 (1975).
205. United States Comments, supra note 90, at 23.
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